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Introduction
There are a few memories I can immediately recall of when my grand-
mother was completely in her element—sitting at our dining room table in the 
crispness of Sunday morning meticulously stringing each flower into leis; her 
hands and knees happily muddied as she pulled out kalo (taro) from the earth; 
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and floating in the lagoon of her home village in American Samoa,1 which was 
both her school and refuge and where she learned how to be a fisherwoman.
Every few years as a child I would accompany my grandmother from the 
only home I knew, Hawai‘i, to Poloa,2 American Samoa.  During these visits, 
I hoped I would feel the same sense of belonging and ease so plainly evident 
in my grandmother’s face as her eyes wrinkled into smiles.  Unfortunately, I 
was quickly reminded that I was cut from a slightly different cloth from those 
around me.  I would hear young children call me “palagi (white)” because of 
how I dressed or how I annunciated my words.  Other times I would catch 
family members sigh “kalofae (poor thing)” with exasperation over my fail-
ure in knowing the intricacies of fa‘a Samoa.3  Although I self-identify as 
Samoan-American, in this cultural dissonance I was viewed as a Samoan in 
Hawai‘i and yet simply as an American in Samoa.
This conflict between how I identify and how others perceive me directly 
reflect the internal tug-of-war that is at the center of the Samoan politic. 
According to the United States, Samoa exists as “one of the distant posses-
sions,”4 a legal fiction that is both the political intent and byproduct of the 
deafening principle of Manifest Destiny.5  In the midst of the western expan-
1. While there is no universal agreement as to the meaning of “Samoa” there have 
been multiple interpretations.  In one definition, “sa” has been interpreted to mean “tribe 
of” with “moa” being the family name of the early Tui Manu’a. Joseph C. Finney, The 
Meaning of the Name Samoa, 82 J. Polynesian Soc’y 301, 301 (1973).  Another interpre-
tation has translated “sa” to mean sacred and “moa” meaning “center”, and therefore in 
collective “Samoa” is to mean “Holy Center.”  The World Factbook: American Samoa, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/aq.html (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Factbook].  Alternatively, it can also be interpreted to 
mean “place of the sacred moa bird.”  Id.  Samoa is separated into two distinct government 
entities.  American Samoa is a territory of the United States, and Samoa, formerly known 
as Western Samoa, is an independent nation.  Id.  Unless otherwise noted, this Comment 
will use “American Samoa” and “Samoa” to only refer to the United States territory and 
not the independent nation.
2. Poloa is a fishing village and is the western most village of Tutuila, the largest 
island in American Samoa.  Residents of Poloa Enjoy the View—And Their New Honor on 
the Global Map, Samoa News (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.samoanews.com/residents-poloa-
enjoy-view-%E2%80%94-and-their-new-honor-global-map; see Factbook supra note 1.
3. See discussion infra Part I.
4. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901).
5. The term “manifest destiny” was originally used to describe the “expectation 
that the U.S., thanks to the superior qualities of the Anglo-Saxons as such and to their 
democratic institutions, would inevitably absorb their neighbors.  Hugh Thomas, Cuba or 
the Pursuit of Freedom 201 (1971).  Although the concept of Manifest Destiny origi-
nally encompassed the continental expansion to the Pacific Ocean and was considered a 
tactic for increasing the number of pro-slavery States, after the Civil War similar themes 
were adopted by the Republican expansionists as a slogan for overseas conquests.  Juan 
R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 57, 60 
n.12 (2013) [hereinafter Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies].  See Juan Torruella, The 
Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 
283, 287 (2007) (“When placed in their historic context, the Insular Cases represent a con-
stitutional law extension of the debate over the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the 
imperialist/manifest destiny causes which that conflict promoted.”); Stanley K. Laughlin, 
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sionism prevalent throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
Supreme Court announced a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases,6 
which developed an unprecedented colonial regime that boxed Samoa and 
the other U.S.  Territories into the legal gray area known as an “unincorpo-
rated territory.”7  In addition to occupying a unique status as a U.S. territory, 
Samoa is wholly distinct from other U.S. territories—the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and Puerto 
Rico—in that its people are deemed “U.S. nationals” instead of U.S. citizens,8 
another term with no historical or constitutional roots.9  Additionally, with 
Jr., The Law of United States Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions § 10.10 at 181 
(“Ironically, the incorporation doctrine which originally legitimated popular desire to fulfill 
America’s manifest destiny now provides the theoretical basis for assuring a large measure 
of territorial self-determination.”).
6. See discussion infra Part II.
7. The Department of Interior defines an unincorporated territory as “[a] United 
States insular area in which the United States Congress has determined that only selected 
parts of the United States constitution apply.”  An incorporated territory, on the other 
hand, is a “United States insular area, of which only one territory exists currently, Palmyra 
Atoll, in which the United States Congress has applied the full corpus of the United States 
Constitution as it applies in the several States.  Incorporation is interpreted as a perpetual 
state.  Once incorporated, the Territory can no longer be de-incorporated.”  Definitions 
of Insular Area Political organizations, Department of Interior, https://www.doi.gov/oia/
islands/politicatypes (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).  Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142–43 
(1904) (“Until Congress shall see fit to incorporate territory ceded by treaty into the United 
States, we regard it as settled by that decision that the territory is to be governed under the 
power existing in Congress to make laws for such territories and such constitutional restric-
tions upon the powers of that body as are applicable to the situation.”); Ediberto Roman, 
Empire Forgotten: The United States’ Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 1119, 
1148 (1997) (arguing creation of “unincorporated territory” label allowed “the United 
States  .  .  .  to deceptively change traditional colonial doctrinal parlance.); Gary Lawson, 
Territorial Governments and the limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853, 864 (1990) (“It 
is also well-settled that territorial governments like Guam’s are ‘entirely the creation of 
Congress,’ which has ‘general and plenary’ authority over the territories.  Congress has 
passed statutes granting Guam substantial powers of self-government, but that is purely a 
matter of legislative grace; the territory ‘has no inherent right to govern itself.’ Given this 
dependence on congressional authorization, the Supreme Court has characterized territo-
rial governments as ‘agencies of the federal government.’”).
8. According to the Internal Revenue Service, a “U.S. National” is defined 
as “[a]n individual who owes his sole allegiance to the United States.”  Immigration 
Terms and Definitions Involving Aliens, Internal Review Service, https://www.irs.gov/ 
individuals/international-taxpayers/immigration-terms-and-definitions-involving-aliens 
(Dec. 20, 2019).  “The following shall be nationals, but not citizens of the United States at 
birth: A person born in an outlying possession of the United States on or after the date of 
formal acquisition of such possession.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West 1988).  U.S. Nationals can-
not hold public office or vote in the United States.  See Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 
2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2013) (“The State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual accordingly cat-
egorizes American Samoa as an unincorporated territory and states that ‘the provisions of 
the Constitution do not apply to persons born there.’ . . .  Several plaintiffs, despite long 
careers in the military or law enforcement, remain unable to vote or to work jobs that 
require citizenship status.”).  For an in-depth analysis of citizenship in Samoa, see generally 
Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2013).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012) (those born in outlying possessions “shall be nationals, 
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no Congressional organic act to establish a territorial government, American 
Samoa is categorized as an “unorganized territory.”10
The underlying legal framework and its historical roots comprise the 
foundation of American Samoa.  It provided fertile grounds for the Samoan 
people to create a “hybrid system of law . . . unique in the world today.”11  This 
system marries Western law and concepts with traditional Samoan custom. 
Even with the colonial influences of the West, the tenets of fa‘a Samoa12—
”‘aiga (family unit), matai system (system of chiefs and leaders), and communal 
lands”—remain central to the Samoan experience and identity.13  In fact, 
Samoa is arguably distinguishable from other nonfederally recognized Indige-
nous14 groups in the United States such that “[o]ver ninety percent of all land 
is communally owned [in Samoa], and attempts to return privately held lands 
to communal status continue today.”15  Additionally, the territory maintains a 
“political structure of chiefly titles.”16  While American Samoa’s culturally 
but not citizens, of the United States at birth”); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(29) (outlying posses-
sions are defined as “American Samoa and Swains Island”); 48 U.S.C. § 1662 (2006) (defin-
ing American Samoa to include Swains Island); Elizabeth K. Watson, Citizens Nowhere: 
The Anomaly of American Samoans’ Citizenship Status After Tuaua v. United States, 42 U. 
Dayton L. Rev. 411, 412 (2017) (“While all others born on American soil have a constitu-
tional birth right to citizenship, American Samoans are not similarly privileged.  The United 
States singly categorizes American Samoans as the country’s only non-citizen nationals.  To 
the world, American Samoans are citizens nowhere.  Although the United States extends 
the right of citizenship to those born within its other island territories, Congressional action 
has explicitly excluded American Samoans.”).
10. Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the last U.S. 
Nationals, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 71, 88 (2013).  An “organized territory” is one that is 
established through an organic act passed by Congress.  American Samoa is considered an 
‘unincorporated,” “unorganized” because it has an elected governor and legislature, but the 
civil government is not a result of an organic act.  Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving legal 
Relationship between the United States and its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. Haw. L. 
Rev. 445, 450 (1992).
11. James R. Thornbury, A Time for Change in the South Pacific?, 67 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 
1099, 1099 (1998).
12. Translated to mean “the Samoan way,” this concept is best described as “the 
essence of being Samoan” as well as a “unique attitude toward fellow human beings, unique 
perceptions of right and wrong, the Samoan heritage, and fundamentally the aggregation 
of everything that the Samoans have learned during their experience as a distinct race.” 
Jeffrey B. Teichert, Resisting Temptation in the Garden of Paradise: Preserving the Role of 
Samoan Custom in the law of American Samoa, 3 Gonz. J. Int’l L. 35, 41–42 (2000).
13. See Line-Noue Memea Kruse, The Pacific Insular Case of American Samoa: 
Land Rights and Law in Unincorporated US Territories 89 (2018).
14. The term “Indigenous” is capitalized in this Comment to denote that these 
groups are proper nouns and have a unique place in historical, legal, and political language. 
See D. Kapua’ala Sproat, Wai Through Kānāwai: Water for Hawai’i’s Streams and Justice 
for Hawaiian Communities, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 127, 127 n.3 (2011) [hereinafter Sproat, Wai 
Through Kānāwai].
15. Daniel E. Hall, Curfews, Culture and Custom in American Samoa: An Analytical 
Map for Applying the U.S. Constitution to the U.S. Territories, 2 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 69, 
72 (2001); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, blood Quantum land laws and the Race versus 
Political Identity Dilemma, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 801, 828 (2008).
16. Karen Armstrong, The Weight of Names in American Samoa, 48 Ethnology 53, 
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distinct structure may have the appearance of self-determination, it is built on 
the unstable foundation of the Insular Cases.  Under the Insular Cases frame-
work, legal challenges are not only possible, but to be expected.
While a modernized and compromised system of governance exists in 
Samoa, it is not protected from the reaches of American courts.  Other territo-
ries have attempted to assert their self-determination in the hopes of creating 
their own Indigenous governance structure, but have been met by an unswayed 
judiciary.17  In considering the territory of Guam, for example, the Ninth Circuit 
was faced with the question: whether the territory’s “political status plebiscite” 
that limits voting to the “Native Inhabitants of Guam” constitutes an “imper-
missible racial classification in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.”18
Guam attempted to use the Insular Cases as a shield to protect the politi-
cal voice of its Indigenous people.  According to case precedent, “[t]he people 
of Guam are forever being reminded that ‘Guam remains an unincorporated 
territory of the United States subject to the plenary power19 of Congress.”20 
56 (2009); see discussion infra Part I.
17. See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942–43 (2016) 
(holding that Puerto Rico is not a “State” under the Bankruptcy Code and therefore can-
not authorize its municipalities to file for Chapter 9 relief); Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 
136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2016) (holding that because Puerto Rico does not enjoy the same 
sovereignty classification as States, it cannot prosecute a single defendant for the same 
criminal conduct because the “oldest roots . . . of Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in 
federal soil.”); Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm’n, 844 F.3d 1087, 1087–90 (9th Cir. 
2016) (holding that a voting limitation to only “persons of Northern Marianas descent” was 
race based and violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
18. Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2019).  The Chamorro or Chamoru are 
Indigenous people of Guam.  According to legal scholar Julian Aguon, “Because the [I]
ndigenous Chamoru people are not recognized under U.S. domestic law as a distinct legal 
entity, i.e., as an [I]ndigenous people privy to certain collective rights such as the rights to 
preserve and protect our cultural integrity and practices, we lack the legal standing neces-
sary to assert rights as an [I]ndigenous people.”  Julian Aguon, other Arms: The Power of a 
Dual Rights legal Strategy For the Chamoru People of Guam Using the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts, 31 U. Haw. L. Rev. 113, 114 (2008).
19. This plenary power is similar to the authority Congress asserts over Indian affairs. 
See Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power over the “other”: Indians, Immigrants, 
Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International law, 
20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 427, 429 (2002) (“Plenary means full, or complete, and applica-
tion of the doctrine means that U.S. courts, rather than assessing the constitutionality of 
governmental action, defer to the ‘political’ branches of government, Congress and the 
executive . . . .  Thus, the plenary power doctrine, though rarely discussed in general con-
stitutional jurisprudence, is core U.S. law relating to American Indian nations, immigrants, 
and colonized territories such as Puerto Rico and Guam.” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 
the Nineteenth Century origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 240 
(2002) (“Courts also have expanded plenary power over territories to recognize a broad 
executive authority over the territories, generally stemming from the strategic function of 
U.S. overseas possessions and the Commander in Chief power.”).  The constitutional basis 
for Congress’s plenary power over territories are rooted in the Territory Clause found in 
Article IV of the United States Constitution.  See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
20. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 27, Davis v. Guam, 2013 WL 5616000 (9th Cir. 
UCLA ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL66 Vol. 24:61
Guam, however, argued that “as an instrumentality of Congress,” a principle 
established through the Insular Cases, the territory was able to limit voting 
to a particular group even on the basis of ancestry.21  Citing caselaw involving 
another U.S. territory, Guam reminded the court that the “Bill of Rights was 
not intended to interfere with the performance of [the United States’] inter-
national obligations.  Nor was it intended to operate as a genocide pact for 
diverse native cultures.  Its bold purpose was to protect minority rights, not 
enforce homogeneity.”22
Unfortunately, the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam rejected 
the territory’s application of the Insular Cases as a shield and claimed that 
“Congress has explicitly extended the Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to Guam when it enacted 
the Organic Act of Guam.”23  As a result, the court found that the plebiscite 
statute impermissibly imposes race-based restrictions in violation of the Fif-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments.24  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
only the lower court’s judgment based on the Fifteenth Amendment, choosing 
not to address the Fourteenth Amendment.25  The court acknowledged that 
while Guam’s status as an unincorporated territory means that federal con-
stitutional rights do not automatically apply absent the will of Congress, the 
Organic Act was amended by Congress in 1968 and as a result incorporated 
the Fifteenth Amendment into the territory.26  This result is demonstrative 
of the United States’ arbitrary treatment of both the territories and the laws 
that govern them.
American jurisprudence has constructed a hierarchy of Indigenous 
peoples.27  There are those Indigenous peoples who are able to be classified 
as federally recognized and therefore deemed to be political entities, while 
2013) (No. 13-15199) (quoting Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002)).
21. Susan K. Serrano, Elevating the Perspectives of U.S. Territorial Peoples: Why the 
Insular Cases Should be Taught in law School, 21 J. Gender Race & Just. 395, 445 (2018).
22. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 27, Davis v. Guam, 2013 WL 5616000 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 13-15199) (quoting Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990)).  Stanley K. 
Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good Idea—and Constitutional, 
27 U. Haw. L. Rev. 331, 338 (2004) [hereinafter Laughlin, Cultural Preservation] (“The 
Wabol rule recognizes that the U.S. Constitution . .  . is not a genocide pact, ‘whether we 
define genocide as physically destroying a people or killing their culture.’”).
23. Davis v. Guam, 2017 WL 930825 slip op. at 14 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
24. Id.
25. Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d at 824 n.4.
26. Id. at 825 n.2.
27. See generally Villazor, supra note 15.  Legal scholar Villazor argues that equal 
protection analysis should be expanded to be more inclusive of all Indigenous peoples, not 
just those federally recognized tribes whose legislations are reviewed under the rational 
basis standard and not strict scrutiny.  Villazor examined the Court’s racial versus political 
dichotomy in regard to its treatment of different Indigenous groups.  According to Villazor, 
the Court in Rice v. Cayetano, “used an ancestral blood requirement to construct a racial 
category and a racial purpose as opposed to the legally permissible political purpose of 
promoting the right of self-government of American Indian tribes.”  Id. at 801.
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others are merely racial.28  The Supreme Court has consistently held any appli-
cable precedent under Federal Indian Law, such as preferential treatment in 
hiring and a recognized government to government relationship, is limited to 
those groups that meet the narrow definition of a federally recognized tribe.29 
American Samoans and other Indigenous peoples of the territories, however, 
must unfortunately rely upon the Insular Cases as a means to protect any ves-
tiges of self-determination.
While Samoa may enjoy the unique system of government it has devel-
oped since Western contact, reliance on the Insular Cases to protect fa‘a 
Samoa and more specifically one of the “cornerstones” of the Samoan cul-
ture and identity—the matai system—may be fatal.  This Comment will 
demonstrate that the Nobility Clauses of the United States Constitution 
may be used to challenge the matai system.  Such an attack, however, can be 
defeated under two separate legal theories: the “impractical and anomalous” 
framework and the showing that the Indigenous leadership system actually 
comports with the Constitution.
Under the first legal theory, the “impractical and anomalous test” was 
developed as a workable filter to determine which constitutional provisions 
apply to an unincorporated territory.  For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit recently held that imposing birthright citizenship on the 
people of American Samoa would be impractical and anomalous.30  Here, the 
Nobility Clauses are inapposite in the American Samoan system.31  However, 
28. See generally Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (articulating that feder-
ally recognized tribes are not racial groups, but rather political entities); but see Rice v. 
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000) (“To extend Mancari to this context would be to permit 
a State, by racial classification, to fence out whole classes of its citizens from decision mak-
ing in critical state affairs.”).
29. See generally Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).  The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, an agency under the Department of Interior, defines a federally recognized tribe as 
an “American Indian or Alaska Native tribal entity that is recognized as having a govern-
ment-to-government relationship with the United States, with the responsibilities, powers, 
limitations, and obligations attached to that designation, and is eligible for funding and 
services from the Bureau of Indian affairs.  Furthermore, federally recognized tribes are 
recognized as possessing certain inherent rights of self-government (i.e., tribal sovereignty) 
and are entitled to receive certain federal benefits, services, and protections because of 
their special relationship with the United States.  At present, there are 573 federally recog-
nized American Indian and Alaska Native tribes and villages.”  FAQ, Bureau of Indian 
Aff., https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).
30. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Notably, at the publication 
of this Comment, this very issue is currently pending review by the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  The United States District Court for the District of Utah has issued a memo-
randum decision finding that those born in American Samoa are guaranteed birthright 
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitisemanu v. United States, 2019 WL 
6766502 (D. Utah 2019); Fili Sagapolutele, Federal Judge Rules American Samoans are 
U.S. Citizens—ASG and Amata Intend to Appeal, Samoa News (Dec. 13, 2019), https://
www.samoanews.com/local-news/update-federal-judge-rules-american-samoans-are-us- 
citizens-asg-and-amata-intend-appeal.
31. See Boumediene v. Busy, 553 U.S. 723, 758–59 (2008); Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 
F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992); Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22.
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because the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the federal govern-
ment has plenary authority over the territories and can unilaterally decide 
to apply the Nobility Clauses to American Samoa.32  Simply put, there is no 
finality for unincorporated territories.
The second legal theory is that the matai system survives constitutional 
scrutiny.  In the event the Nobility Clauses are applied to Samoa, the tradi-
tional form of Samoan leadership actually comports with the very intent of 
the Framers.  If there is a legitimate claim based on the Nobility Clauses, it 
would be against the Secretary of Interior who holds unfettered power over 
the territories, and there is no political process to elect or remove such a gov-
ernment official.33
Part I of this Comment will explore the cultural relationship and sig-
nificance of fa‘a Samoa to Samoan society, and the necessity of the matai 
system in both traditional and modern times.  The High Court in Samoa 
best articulated this necessity by declaring that the tenets of fa‘a Samoa 
to “the American Samoan is life itself.”34  Part II will unpack the Insular 
Cases and the doctrine of territorial incorporation.  While the doctrine 
may be steeped in colonial history and racist notions, the “impractical and 
anomalous test” developed by the courts has the potential to serve as a 
framework for the protection of Indigenous self-determination.  Part III 
will trace the sociohistorical context of and the Framers’ intent behind the 
Nobility Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, breaking down what a constitu-
tional challenge based on the clauses might entail and how the matai system 
would be vulnerable.  Part IV will demonstrate that applying the Nobil-
ity Clauses to the unique government system in American Samoa would 
be both “impractical and anomalous,” and lead to the unraveling and sub-
sequent cultural destruction of fa‘a Samoa.  Lastly, Part V will illustrate 
that even if the courts or Congress were to apply the Nobility Clauses, the 
matai system would meet constitutional muster because the cultural prac-
tice comports with constitutional intent and the very democratic ideals that 
the United States was founded on.
32. U.S. Const. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
33. See Thornbury, supra note 11, at 1102.  “However, the Secretary of the Interior 
retains nearly all legislative, executive and judicial power over this territory.  He can appoint 
and remove officials at will, overturn decisions of the Samoan courts, and amend nearly the 
entire governing system.  The only governing matter which Congress has withdrawn from 
the Secretary is the ability to amend the Samoan Constitution, which limitation occurred 
only in 1983.”  Id.
34. Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 A.S.R.2d 10, 13 (App. Div. 1980).
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I. America Samoa and the “Samoan Way of Life”
Samoa has been described as an “anomaly,”35 “the most important 
island in the Pacific” for the U.S. Navy,36 “unique,”37 and even as the “actual 
historic location of the Garden of Paradise.”38  All these descriptions notwith-
standing, American Samoa is an archipelago of small islands with the nearest 
country being Tonga at approximately 330 miles; Hawai‘i is approximately 
2500 miles away.39  With a total surface area of about 224 square kilometers, 
American Samoa is slightly larger than Washington, D.C.40
Compared to other Indigenous Pacific territories, American Samoa is 
distinct for three reasons.  First, American Samoa ranks at the top among 
states and territories in residents per capita who volunteer for the U.S. Army,41 
and sixth for the other military branches.42  Second, and vital to understand-
ing the context in which American Samoa exists, the island boasts the most 
homogenous and Indigenous population.43  From a 2018 demographic esti-
mate, there are approximately 50,826 residents in American Samoa with 92.6 
percent identifying as Pacific Islander (88.9 percent as Samoans, 2.9 percent 
Tongan, and 0.8 percent identifying as other).44  This data is monumental 
when compared to Guam that has a population of 167,772 with 37.3 percent 
identifying as Chamorro, 26.3 percent as Filipino, and Chuukese with 7 per-
cent.45  Additionally, in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
the population is approximately 51,994, of which 50 percent of its residents 
identifying as Asian (Filipino 35.3 percent, Chinese 6.8 percent, Korean 4.2 
35. Kruse, supra note 13, at 76 (“American Samoa is an anomaly.  It is the only 
U.S. territory that is politically and legally classified as ‘unorganized’ and ‘unincorporated’ 
because, although it has a legislature (Fono) and an elected governor, the operation of the 
civil government is not the result of an Organic Act.”).
36. Id. at 28 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State John Hay who stated that Tutuila was 
“the most important island in the Pacific as regards harbor conveniences for our navy, and 
a station on the trans-Pacific route”).
37. Tuaua v. United States, 951 F.Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2013).
38. Talili v. Satele, 4 Am. Samoa 2d 23, 26–27 (Land & Titles Div. 1987).
39. What are the Differences between Western Samoa and American Samoa, World 
Atlas, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-are-the-differences-between- samoa-and-
american-samoa.html (Oct. 19, 2019).
40. Factbook, supra note 1.
41. Adam Clanton, born to Run: Can an American Samoan become President?, 29 
UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 135, 139 (2012) (citing StateMaster, Military Statistics—Total Army 
Recruits by State, http://www.statemaster.com/graph/mil_arm_rec_per_pac_isl-army- 
recruits-percent-pacific-islander).
42. Id.
43. This Comment does not contend that having a homogenous Indigenous popula-
tion is the reason why Samoans, as opposed to other Indigenous peoples, should continue to 
enjoy a cultural centric government and an exclusive land alienation policy.  The population 
comparison with the other Pacific territories is to merely point out that Samoa’s homog-
enous population and that 90 percent of the land is owned by its Indigenous people, are 
significant factors that have contributed to Samoa’s unique assertion of self- determination.
44. Factbook, supra note 1.
45. The World Factbook: Guam, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/gq.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
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percent, and other Asian 3.7 percent) and with Native Hawaiians or other 
Pacific Islanders comprising of 34.9 percent.46  Third, American Samoa has 
preserved and incorporated its traditional way of life known as fa‘a Samoa 
into its government “and take[s] pride in [its] unique political and cultural 
practices.”47
A. Tracing the History of American Samoa Today
Before analyzing the potential (and expected) challenges to fa‘a Samoa, 
it is necessary to understand the context that has cultivated what American 
Samoa is today.  Absorbing Samoa into the United States politic was not a 
singular display of America’s expansionist policies, but rather, was demon-
strative of America’s larger political and racial aims.48  Indeed, the legal 
foundation upon which colonization rests can be traced to the Doctrine of 
Discovery.49  The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions that became known 
as the Marshall Trilogy, articulated a colonial tool that displaced Native 
46. The World Factbook: Northern Mariana Islands, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/cq.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2019).
47. Tuaua v. United States, 951 F.Supp. 2d 88, 91 (D.C.C. 2013).
48. See Robert J. Miller & Jacinta Ruru, An Indigenous lens into Comparative law: 
The Doctrine of Discovery in the United States and New Zealand, 111 W. Va. L. Rev. 849, 
871–73 (2009) (“After the Lewis and Clark expedition, American history is dominated by 
an erratic but fairly constant advance of American interests across the continent under 
the principles of the Doctrine of Discovery.  This was not an accident but was instead the 
expressed goal of Presidents Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Polk, and 
a host of other American politicians and citizens. ‘Manifest Destiny’ is the name that was 
ultimately used to describe this predestined and divinely inspired advance . . . .  Thereafter, 
the advocates of Manifest Destiny then used the Doctrine of Discovery and its elements to 
prove that it was America’s destiny to reach the Pacific.”); Carlos R. Soltero, The Supreme 
Court Should overrule the Territorial Incorporation Doctrine and End one Hundred years 
of Judicially Condoned Colonialism, 22 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 35 (2001) (“The issue 
of race relations goes to the very essence of the [doctrine of territorial incorporation] 
since the colonial inhabitants were, and remain, overwhelmingly not Anglos.”); Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., Columbus’s legacy: law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, 8 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 51, 72 (1991) 
(“The basis of the Court’s holding in Johnson, the Doctrine of Discovery, as even Marshall 
was forced to concede, originated in the cultural racism of the Christian European peoples 
who invaded and colonized the New World.”).
49. Robert J. Miller, American Indians, the Doctrine of Discovery, and Manifest 
Destiny, 11 Wyo. L. Rev. 329, 330–31 (2011) (“The English colonists in North America and 
then the American colonial, state, and federal governments all utilized the Doctrine [of 
Discovery] and its religious, cultural, and racial ideas of superiority over Native Americans 
to stake legal claims to the lands and property rights of the [I]ndigenous peoples.  Ultimately, 
the United States enforced the Doctrine against the Indian nations as American Manifest 
Destiny led the United States’ expansion across the continent.”); Robert T. Coulter & 
Steven M. Tullberg, Indian land Rights, in The Aggressions of Civilization 185, 190 
(Sandra L. Cadwalder & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984) (“The doctrine of discovery came 
into existence with the rapid expansion of European empires in the fifteenth century.  Its 
basic tenet—that the European nation which first ‘discovered’ and settled lands previously 
unknown to Europeans thereby gained the exclusive right to acquire those lands from their 
occupants—became part of the early body of international law dealing with aboriginal 
peoples.”).
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Americans’ right to land ownership, instead granting an “Indian title of occu-
pancy.”50  According to the Court, the United States’ obtained “superior 
title” because of its self-proclaimed “discovery.”51  This mentality continued 
through various policy adaptations from the Northwest Ordinance of 178752 
to the doctrine of territorial incorporation under the Insular Cases.53  It is 
these permutations and expansion of the Doctrine of Discovery that pushed 
the United States westward and eventually overseas.54  As anthropologist 
Patrick Wolfe aptly describes, “[L]and acquisition as well as the wealth and 
opportunities it brought were the principal factors that motivated settlement 
and imposed the interminable process of Indigenous possession, elimination 
by various means, and the legitimation of settler sovereignty over both land 
and people.”55  It should come as no surprise that the United States landed on 
the shores of Samoa in 1839 during an “exploratory expedition.”56
The United States was interested in Samoa’s strategic location in the 
Pacific.  Samoa proved to be an ideal place for vessels to fuel, rest, and gather 
provisions for routes between China or Japan to San Francisco or Hawai‘i.57 
United States Navy Commander Richard Meade attempted to negotiate a 
bilateral treaty to provide American protection in exchange for establish-
ing a naval station at Pago Pago harbor.58  Unfortunately, the agreement was 
50. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823); see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 
520 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831).
51. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 
30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823) (“They were admitted to 
be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession 
of it, . . . but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they 
pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive 
title to those who made it.”).
52. Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, U.S.C.A. Northwest 
Ordinance (West) (1787).  “The said territory, and the States which may be formed therein, 
shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the United States of America, subject to 
the Articles of Confederation, and to such alterations therein as shall be constitutionally 
made.”  Id. at § 14, art. 4.
53. Kruse, supra note 13, at 106 (“The ‘Splendid Little War’ (as it was described by 
Theodore Roosevelt) fed the American political machine with victory and a belief that 
the Monroe Doctrine called for the United States to expand policy democracy outside the 
Americas.”).
54. See Miller & Ruru, supra note 48, at 872 (“Rather than being a new idea, Manifest 
Destiny grew out of the elements of the Doctrine of Discovery, Thomas Jefferson’s ambi-
tions, and the Lewis and Clark expedition.”).
55. Kruse, supra note 13, at 24 (citing Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the 
Elimination of the Native, 8 J. Genocide Res. 387, 388 (2006)).
56. Arnold H. Leibowitz, American Samoa: Decline of a Culture, 10 Cal. W. Int’l 
L.J. 220, 227 (1980) [hereinafter Leibowitz, American Samoa] (citing to Senate Comm. On 
Interior and Insular Affairs, Study Mission to Eastern [American] Samoa, S. Doc. No. 
38, at 3–4 (1st Sess. 1961)).
57. Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the 
Insular Cases, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 101, 168 (2011).
58. Kruse, supra note 13, at 27.
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never ratified by Congress.59  Other countries, specifically Great Britain and 
Germany, also saw the value and strategy of the islands and began to claim 
Samoan lands and build relationships with the matai.60
Conflicts between the three nations grew as each attempted to exert 
its own influence over the islands.61  These tensions led to the Berlin Treaty 
of 1889, which sought to abate the disputes between the three countries.62 
While the Berlin Treaty established the island as an “independent and neutral 
nation,”  the “independent” Samoa was nonetheless under the supervision 
and control of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.63  The treaty 
did not subdue the rising tensions between the three countries.64  In 1899, the 
countries met again to address their competing claims, and enlisted the Kings 
of Sweden and Norway as the arbitrators.65
At the conclusion of the convention, the Tripartite Treaty of 1899 was 
signed.66  Germany and Great Britain absolved all claims to Tutuila and the 
other eastern islands.67  In return, the United States granted all rights to Upolu, 
Savai‘i, and the other western islands to Germany.68  The treaty became the 
means to “secure a strong American presence, which it accomplished through 
the establishment of the Tutuila naval station.”69  The convention also pre-
served trade rights to all three countries within the Samoan Islands.70
59. Id.
60. JoAnna Poblete-Cross, bridging Indigenous and Immigrant Struggles: A Case 
Study of American Samoa, 62 Am. Q. 501, 502 (2010).
61. Michael W. Weaver, The Territorial Federal Jurisdiction Forgot: The Question of 
Greater Federal Jurisdiction in American Samoa, 17 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 324, 344 (2008).
62. Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 492.
63. General Act by and Between the United States of America, the Empire of 
Germany, & the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Ireland, Providing for the Neutrality 
& Autonomous Gov’t of the Samoan Islands., art. I, May 21, 1890, 26 Stat. 1497 (“It is 
declared that the Islands of Samoa are neutral territory in which the citizens and subjects 
of the Three Signatory Powers have equal rights of residence, trade and personal protec-
tion.”).
64. Convention Between the United States of America, Germany, and Great Britain, 
Relating to the Settlement of Certain Claims in Samoa by Arbitration, Nov. 7, 1898, 31 Stat. 
1875.
65. Id.
66. Convention Between the United States, Germany, & Great Britain to Adjust 
Amicably the Questions Between the Three Governments in Respect to the Samoan Grp. 
of Islands., Feb. 16, 1900, 31 Stat. 1878.
67. Id.; Van Dyke, supra note 10, at 492–93.
68. Convention Between the United States of America, Germany, and Great Britain, 
Relating to the Settlement of Certain Claims in Samoa by Arbitration, Nov. 7, 1898, 31 Stat. 
1875.
69. Kruse, supra note 13, at 106.
70. Id.
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In 1900 and 1904, both the matai of Tutuila and the King of Manu‘a71 
respectively ceded the islands to the United States.72  In exchange for cessa-
tion, the matai arranged for the protection of traditional Indigenous Samoan 
rights and more precisely asserted two “non-negotiable protections”—
customary lands and the matai system.73  The Deed of Cession “granted 
protective sovereignty to the United States while at the same time empow-
er[ed] chiefs to control their own villages and districts according to the fa‘a 
Samoa.”74  Agreeing to the protection of fa‘a Samoa aligned with the United 
States’ own self-interests.75  Allowing land restrictions under traditional matai 
leaders “functioned to protect the United States’ new territorial possession 
from foreign encroachment.”76
The islands were initially under the control of the United States Depart-
ment of the Navy, with the naval commander serving as governor of the 
territory.77  Within two weeks of the cessation, the governor signed Regula-
tion 5, which “applied U.S. laws to the territory, as long as they did not conflict 
with Samoan customs.” 78 Additionally, the administration created an official 
registration of matai titles to facilitate succession procedures in the event that 
Samoans were unable to select a new titleholder.79
71. At the time, Manu’a was considered its own kingdom that was separate from the 
other Samoan Islands. Arthur A. Morrow, My Thirty-Two Years in American Samoa 6 
(1974).
72. Cession of Tutuila and Aunu’u, Am. Sam. B. Ass’n, https://www.asbar.org/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1950&Itemid=184 (last visited Dec. 29, 2019); 
American Samoa, Dep’t of Interior, https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/american-samoa (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2019).
73. See Kruse, supra note 13, at 38; Weaver, supra note 61, at 345–346; Van Dyke, 
supra note 10, 492–93.
74. Ivy Yeung, The Price of Citizenship: Would Citizenship Cost American Samoa its 
National Identity, 17 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 1, 6 (2016); see Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. 
Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“First, the instruments of Cession by which these 
islands undertook allegiance to the United States provided that the United States would 
‘respect and protect the individual rights of all people . . . to their land,’ and would recog-
nize such rights ‘according to their customs.’”).
75. Villazor, supra note 15, at 828 (“The decoupling of sovereignty and poverty was 
significant because the protection of property rights functioned as a form of political auton-
omy within the context of colonialism.  It protected the [I]ndigenous peoples’, particularly 
the chiefs’ critical leadership roles in the social landscape of American Samoa.”).
76. Id. at 827; Poblete-Cross, supra note 60, at 503 (“This restriction prevented the 
purchase of [I]ndigenous land by private foreigners, thus avoiding the exploitation of these 
lands by independent Western businessmen.”).
77. Captain J.A.C. Gray, Amerika Samoa, A History of American Samoa and its 
United States Naval Administration 108 (1960).
78. Poblete-Cross, supra note 60, at 503; David A. Chappell, The Forgotten Mau: Anti-
Navy Protest in American Samoa, 1920–1935, 69 Pac. Hist. Rev. 217, 222 (2000).  “The Navy 
attempted to step lightly and maintain the pre-existing Samoan social and political struc-
ture.”  Weaver, supra note 61, at 345.
79. Weaver, supra note 61, at 346.
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In 1951, President Truman transferred the administrative authority of 
American Samoa from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of Interior.80 
The Secretary of Interior maintained its nearly unrestricted control over the 
territory.81  The Secretary granted a limited form of self-determination when 
it allowed Samoans to create their own constitution in 1962, which was later 
revised in 1967.82  Samoans feared that all provisions of the United States 
Constitution would be applicable to the island, and thus fought Congress to 
create one of their own.83  The full weight of the Constitution, and in particular 
the application of the Equal Protection Clause, would leave their communal 
land and matai system at risk for a race-based challenge.84
The adopted Samoan Constitution melded both Western and Samoan 
concepts: it created three branches of government similar to those of United 
States,85 required Senators to be registered matai holders,86 and stated an 
express commitment to the protection of “lands, customs, culture, and the tra-
ditional Samoan family organization of persons of Samoan ancestry.”87
B. The Matai System—A “Cornerstone” of Fa‘a Samoa
There are two cornerstones of fa‘a Samoa, or features of an Indige-
nous Samoan living in American Samoa: the system of communal land tenure 
and the matai system.88  Fa‘a Samoa has been fittingly described as an ‘‘ie 
toga,’ loosely translated to mean ‘a fine mat,’ which holds significant cere-
monial, political, and social value.89  In fact, one nineteenth-century observer 
described a renowned mat as “a title-deed to rank and money.”90  Similar to 
the ‘ie toga that is made from finely woven pandanus leaves, the existence of 
fa‘a Samoa is dependent on the tightly weaving of communal lands and the 
matai system.  If any of the threads are unraveled, “the whole pattern of the 
Samoan way of life will be forever destroyed.”91
80. See Exec. Order No. 10264, 3 C.F.R. § 765 (1949–1953) (transferring administra-
tive authority and oversight to the Secretary of the Interior).
81. Thornbury, supra note 11, at 1102.  I use this to describe the Secretary of Interior’s 
authority as nearly unrestricted because in 1983 Congress withdrew from the Secretary the 
ability to amend the Samoan constitution.  See id.
82. See Watson, supra note 9, at 415.
83. Robert C. Kiste, Tides of History: The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth 
Century 247 (K.R. Howe et al. eds., 1994); Weaver, supra note 61, at 347.
84. Kiste, supra note 83; Weaver, supra 61, at 347.
85. Am. Sam. Const. art. II (legislature), art. III (judicial branch), art. IV (executive 
branch).
86. Am. Sam. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
87. Am. Sam. Const. art. I, § 3.
88. See A.P. Lutali & William J. Stewart, A Chieftal System in Twentieth Century 
America: legal Aspects of the Matai System in the Territory of American Samoa, 4 Ga. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 387, 388 (1975).
89. ‘Ie Toga (fine mat), https://collections.tepapa.govt.nz/object/91919 (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2020).
90. Jocelyn Linnekin, Fine Mats and Money: Contending Exchange Paradigms in 
Colonial Samoa, 64 Anthropological Q.  1, 3 (1991).
91. Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United 
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An original and historic translation of the word matai may be difficult to 
trace but does merit some discussion.  The term was construed by foreigners 
to mean “chief,” but such a definition is too narrow and often understood in a 
context that is separate from Samoa or the Pacific Islands.92  A more accurate 
word would be “leader.”93  The word may have been the combination of mata 
meaning “eye” and iai meaning “to” or “toward,” which together would mean 
“to look toward another.”94
There are multiple matai titles that correspond with a hierarchy, which 
is reflected in almost every structure of Samoan life from the ‘aiga (roughly 
translated into “family,” or typically described as the title holder’s cognatic 
descent group), village, district, and island.95  The ranking among matai is 
determined by history, genealogy, kinship relations, mythology, the ability to 
garner supporters, and origin of the title.96  According to Samoan law, the title 
must be properly registered with the government and no person is to have 
more than one title at a time.97  There is such deference to the matai that 
asserting a title that has not been properly registered or claiming a title that 
has been removed by proper proceeding is a class B misdemeanor.98
The traditional leaders, which include both men and women, have 
various roles.99  The matai are not just linked to a geographic area, but are 
associated with a specific plot of land.100  Leaders are tasked with allocating 
and determining the use of the land among immediate and extended family, 
and if applicable, other village members.101  Its role is based on “group respon-
sibility”102 and promoting the “common good.”103  The Samoan High Court 
succinctly described this vital traditional role:
The duties and responsibilities of a matai defy common law labels.  They 
are more than chiefs who are merely leaders.  They are more than trust-
ees who merely protect property.  A matai has an awesome responsibility 
to his family.  He must protect it and its lands.  He acts for the family 
in its relations with others.  He gives individual family members advice, 
States Territorial Relations 424 (Kluwer Academic 1989).
92. Lutali & Stewart, supra note 88, at 389.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Kruse, supra note 13, at 13–14; Weaver, supra note 61, at 342.
96.  Id.
97. Am. Samoa Code Ann. § 1.0402.
98. Am. Samoa Code Ann. § 1.0414.
99. Michael Keyser, The best Kept Secret in the law: How to Get Paid to live on 
a Tropical Island, 15 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 219, 231 (2006); Merrily Stover, Individual 
land Tenure in American Samoa, 11 Contemp. Pac. 69, 72 (1999).
100. Stover, supra note 99.
101. See Villazor, supra note 15, at 826; Leibowitz, American Samoa, supra note 56, at 
223.
102. Uilisone Falemanu Tua, A Native’s Call for Justice: The Call for the Establishment 
of a Federal District Court in American Samoa, 11 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 246, 250 (2010) 
(citing Peter Tali Coleman, Peter Tali Coleman on the FbI Report, Samoa News, Aug. 7, 
1995).
103. Irving Goldman, Ancient Polynesian Society 268–69 (1970).
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direction and help.  He administers the family affairs, designates which 
members of the family will work particular portions of the family land, 
and determines where families will live.  His relationship to his family is a 
relationship not known to common law.104
The matai’s duty and service to the family is derived from the fact that it 
is the ‘aiga that bestows the title upon the individual.  Framed in a western con-
text, the matai is “owned” by the ‘aiga.105  It is a lifetime appointment, unless 
family members petition and the Samoan judicial system strips the title from 
the former chief.106  Most importantly, the matai is voted by the consensus 
of the ‘aiga, as opposed to a simple majority.107  Requiring a consensus com-
pels the family to come together to have dialogue and compromise, resolve 
any objections, and to promote harmony.108  These deeply-rooted traditions 
and customs stood in stark contrast to the United States’ empire-building 
approach at the start of the twentieth century, as described in the next Part.
II. The Insular Cases and the new Manifest Destiny
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in a 
colonial regime that was unprecedented.109  Prior to the nine Supreme Court 
decisions that comprise the Insular Cases, the Northwest Ordinance laid out 
the legal process and principle for the newly acquired “possessions.”  These 
new territories were expected to and eventually became incorporated into 
the United States as states.110  However, with the conclusion of the Span-
ish-American War and the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and 
Guam, the United States backed away from “U.S. law and tradition” and con-
templated a new process to deal with the distant lands.111  Professor Rubin 
Francis Weston described the America’s doctrinal tensions:
Those who advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: What 
kind of relationship would the new peoples have with the body politic?  
Was it to be the relationship of the Reconstruction period, an attempt 
104. Poumele v. Ma’ae, 2 A.S.R.2d 4, 5 (App. Div. 1984).
105. Kruse, supra note 13, at 13–14.
106. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22, at 338.
107. Id.
108. Teichert, supra note 12, at 41.
109. Pedro Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [that] Follows the 
Flag . . . but Doesn’t Quite Catch Up With It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. 
Bush, 80 Miss. L.J. 181, 204 (2010).
110. Leibowitz, supra note 91, at 6; Jose A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American 
Empire: Notes on the legislative History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 391, 411 (1978).  The first treaty to articulate this territorial doctrine 
occurred in 1803 with the United States’ purchase of Louisiana from France.  According to 
the agreement, “The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union 
of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the 
Federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of cit-
izens of the United States.”  Treaty Between the United States and the French Republic, 
U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 200, Apr. 30, 1803, T.S. No. 86 (Apr. 30, 1803).
111. Leibowitz, supra note 91.
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at political equality for dissimilar races, or was it to be the Southern 
“counterrevolutionary” point of view which denied the basic American 
constitutional rights to people of color?  The actions of the federal gov-
ernment during the imperial period and the relegation of the Negro to 
a status of second-class citizenship indicated that the Southern point of 
view would prevail.  The racism which caused the relegation of the Negro 
to a status of inferiority was to be applied to the overseas possessions of 
the United States.112
The Supreme Court articulated this doctrinal shift in the Insular 
Cases, which were described as a “judicial drama of truly Olympian propor-
tions” and “the most hotly contested and long continued duel in the life of 
the Supreme Court.”113  While it may not be the first of the Insular Cases, 
Downes v. bidwell stands today as the “centerpiece”114 and principal decision 
of the Insular Cases.115  The controversy in Downes arose over the Foraker 
Act, which imposed duties on products brought into the United States from 
Puerto Rico.116  The petitioner, S.B. Downes & Company, argued that the Uni-
formity Clause of the Constitution, which provides that “all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States,” invalidated New 
York’s law because Puerto Rico was part of the United States following the 
ratification of the 1898 Treaty of Paris with Spain.117  In addition to determin-
ing the constitutionality of the Foraker Act, the Court was also left to decide 
whether the Uniformity Clause was to “extend” to the new territories.118  Jus-
tice Henry B. Brown described the question posed to the Court: “[U]pon the 
ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain, Porto Rico [sic] ceased to be a 
foreign country, and became a territory . . . [and] we are now asked to hold 
that it became a part of the United States . . . .”119
The controversy present in the Downes case was evidenced by the fact 
that no opinion by the Court garnered a majority.120  In fact, five justices filed 
their own separate opinions.121  Justice Brown determined that the Unifor-
mity Clause could not be applied to Puerto Rico because the territory is 
“appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United 
States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution.”122  According to Justice 
Brown, the inhabitants of the possessions are “alien races, differing from us in 
112. Rubin Francis Weston, Racism in U.S. Imperialism: The Influence of Racial 
Assumptions on American Foreign Policy, 1893–1946 15 (1972).
113. John Davis, Edward Douglass White, 7 A.B.A. J. 377, 378 (1921).
114. Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, A Most Insular Minority: Reconsidering Judicial 
Deference to Unequal Treatment in light of Puerto Rico’s Political Process Failure, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 797, 803 (2010).
115. See Malavet, supra note 109, at 214.
116. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901).
117. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
118. Downes, 182 U.S. at 249.
119. Id. at 248–49.
120. Serrano, supra note 21, at 406.
121. Id.
122. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
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religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought” and their 
incorporation into the United States would be “a false step” that threatens 
“what Chief Justice Marshall called the American empire.”123
Justice Edward Douglass White’s concurrence, joined by Justices Shiras 
and McKenna, articulated what would be the rule of the Insular Cases and 
the prevailing opinion in the latter case of Dorr v. United States.124  White’s 
legal proposition, the territorial incorporation doctrine, created two dis-
tinct classifications.  “Incorporated” territories are those slated for statehood 
because they are “an integral part of the United States” and “worthy . . . of 
such blessing.”125  White emphasized a deference to Congress and the legisla-
tive branch’s plenary authority under the Territorial Clause which states, “The 
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make needful Rules and Reg-
ulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States.”126  “Unincorporated territories,” however, are a legal fiction created 
by the court.  It excludes those “uncivilized race[s]” of people from the priv-
ileges and immunities enjoyed by the “white inhabitants” of states, and yet 
whose lands “rich in soil” are still within the reach of “the United States for 
commercial and strategic reasons.”127  Simply put, unincorporated territories 
are “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense.”128
Often described as “flexible,” the doctrine of incorporation that White 
articulated, was not designed to support Indigenous self-determination but 
instead legitimized colonialism and unequal treatment.129  In fact, it allowed 
the political branches to select which provisions of the Constitution would 
be applicable to the unincorporated territory through an “inquiry into the 
situation of the territory and its relations to the United States.”130  The racist 
undertones throughout the Insular Cases come as no surprise as it was almost 
the exact same court that decided Plessy v. Ferguson and espoused the infa-
mous “separate but equal” doctrine in 1896.131
But why did the Court treat the island territories wholly differently 
when prior to the Insular Cases, the unincorporated territory did not exist? 
123. Id.
124. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922) (“[T]he opinion of [Mr.] Justice 
White of the majority, in Downes v. bidwell, become the settled law of the court.”); Dorr v. 
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1904).
125. Downes, 182 U.S. at 312.
126. U.S. Const. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
127. Downes, 182 U.S. at 306, 320.
128. Id. at 341.
129. See Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo loophole, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 13 
(2004); Efren Rivera Ramos, The legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular 
Cases (1901–1922), 65 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 225, 290 (1996).
130. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 307 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Downes 
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 293 (1901) (White, J., concurring)); American Samoa and the 
Citizenship Clause, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1694 (2017).
131. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies, supra note 5, at 68; Juan R. Torruella, 
The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of Separate and Unequal 3–5 
(1988) (drawing comparisons between Plessy v. Ferguson and the Insular Cases).
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Judge Juan Torruella described the differences in the overseas colonies which 
helps contextualize the Supreme Court’s decisions and the governments 
treatment of those inhabitants.  He explained:
There were, of course, factual differences between these newly conquered 
Spanish lands and the territories annexed prior to 1898—differences 
which, as we shall see, were used by the Supreme Court as an excuse for 
its differing constitutional treatment of these new acquisitions.  The new 
lands were non-contiguous islands separated by thousands of miles of 
ocean from the U.S. continental mainland.  Perhaps more importantly, 
they were not, in contrast to the American West, large areas of mostly 
uninhabited land masses, but were instead populated by established com-
munities whose inhabitants differed from the dominant state-side societal 
structures with respect to their race, language, customs, cultures, religions, 
and even legal systems.132
While the Insular Cases may have been bound by the colonial and 
racist chains prevalent during that time period, they have since been refash-
ioned in a few cases as a tool to assert self-determination.133  Samoa has taken 
advantage of the legal limbo that it occupies and has been able to protect fa‘a 
Samoa.  In fact, in Samoa’s 3000-year history, the people “have never been a 
landless people, nor have their lands been sold to non-Samoans (except for 
less than three percent freehold lands sold prior to the 1900 Deeds of Ces-
sion).”134  However, under this legal framework, American Samoa’s cultural 
institutions are vulnerable and open to Constitutional attacks as evidenced in 
attempts to impose birthright citizenship135 and its communal land policies.136 
The matai system is no exception.
III. The Nobility Clauses and the Constitutional Challenge to 
the Matai System
A challenge to the matai system would most likely be based on the 
theory that the cultural leaders contravene the Nobility Clauses of the United 
States Constitution.  Accordingly, the two clauses are as follows:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin money; emit Bills of Credit; make 
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass 
any Bill of Attainder, ex post factor Law, or Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts, or grant a Title of Nobility.137
132. Id. at 62.
133. See Serrano, supra note 21, at 400.
134. Kruse, supra note 13, at 43.
135. See generally Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 301–02 (holding it “anomalous to impose citizen-
ship over the objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as expressed through 
their democratically elected representatives”).
136. See generally Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 A.S.R.2d 10 (App. Div. 1980) 
(finding that “restrictions on the alienation of all lands, except freehold lands, are necessary 
to the accomplishments of the desired ends of preserving Samoan lands and culture for 
Samoans”).
137. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
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No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person 
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Con-
sent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of 
any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.138
The Nobility Clauses may be implicated because the matai are not just 
cultural symbols, but have specific roles and functions in Samoan society that 
have been enumerated and protected both constitutionally139 and statuto-
rily140  within the territorial government.  As such, the matai are more than 
just tolerated by territorial law.  In fact, the government and the Indigenous 
leaders actively intersect as evidenced by the government’s regulation of the 
chiefly titles.141
However, such a constitutional attack would face many difficulties.  Not 
only would it be an issue of first impression if such a case were to reach the 
United States Supreme Court, but the Court has never had the occasion to 
substantively interpret the clauses or provide meaning to them.142  In fact, in 
1837, the Court refused to provide an analysis of the clauses.143  In briscoe v. 
bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, Justice Henry Baldwin declared in his 
concurring opinion that a discussion on the Nobility Clauses was “useless” 
because “there has never been any difference of opinion as to the meaning 
of . . . a title of nobility.”144
138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
139. Am. Samoa Const. art II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[B]e the registered matai of a Samoan family 
who fulfills his obligations as required by Samoan custom in the county from which he is 
elected.”); art. IV, § 4 (“The Secretary of Samoan Affairs shall be appointed by the Governor 
from among the leading registered matais.  He shall hold office during the pleasure of the 
Governor.  The Secretary of Samoan Affairs shall be the head of the Department of Local 
Government.  In conjunction with the District Governors he shall coordinate the adminis-
tration of the district, county, and village affairs as provided by law and also in conjunction 
with the District Governors he shall supervise all ceremonial functions as provided by 
law.”).
140. A.S.C.A. §  1.0401 (“Registration required—closing of register.”); §  1.0402 
(“Registering more than one matai title prohibited.”); § 1.0403 (“Qualifications for succes-
sion to title—Delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, staff members, dependents.”); 
§  1.0404 (“Eligibility to file claim or objection—Record of absent residents—Delegate 
to the U.S. House of Representatives and staff members.”); §  1.0405 (“Filing written 
claim—Supporting documents.”); § 1.0406 (“Notice of claim.”); § 1.0407 (“Counterclaims 
and objections—Supporting documents.”); §  1.0408 (“Certificate of succession to issue 
if no counterclaim or objection is filed.”); §  1.0409 (“Disputed claims—Hearing—
Determination—Certificate issued when.”); §  1.0410 (“Effective date of succession.”); 
§ 1.0411 (“Removal of title for cause—Service of petition—Default—Selection of succes-
sor.”); § 1.0412 (“Removal of title after year’s absence—Procedure—Default.”); § 1.0413 
(“Nonrecognition of titles improperly bestowed.”); §  1.0414 (“Violation—Penalty.”); 
§ 37.0204 (“Restrictions on alienation of land.”).
141. Id. § 1.0401 (“Registration required—closing of register.”); § 1.0402 (“Registering 
more than one matai title prohibited.”).
142. Maurice H. McBride, The Application of the American Constitution to American 
Samoa, 9 J. Int’l L. & Econ. 325, 348 (1974).
143. See generally Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, 36 U.S. 257 (1837).
144. Id. at 70 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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It was not until over a century later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, that the 
Court slightly referenced the clauses.145  In Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent, 
he asserted that the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, which required 
state and local governments to use a portion of the federal funds granted 
for public works projects to purchase services and goods from minority 
owned-businesses was unconstitutional.146  According to Justice Stevens, 
having a statutorily preferred class of citizens directly conflicts with the Nobil-
ity Clauses.  He stated, “Our historic aversion to titles of nobility is only one 
aspect of our commitment to the proposition that the sovereign has a funda-
mental duty to govern impartially.”147  Justice Stevens did articulate, however, 
that even if government action implicated the Nobility Clauses, those actions 
can be constitutional if there is a reason for the difference and if the “classi-
fication be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate.”148  In particular, 
he inferred that a preference may be legitimate if there are “economic, social, 
geographical, or historical criteria” that are relevant.149
Additionally, Justice Stevens provided limited historical context, 
describing that the Framers, in reaction to the “shadow of ancient feudal tra-
ditions . . . set out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions among 
white men on account of their birth.”150  Justice Stevens was the lone justice 
on the bench to discuss the Nobility Clauses and no other member of the 
Court referenced or inferred to it.
Notwithstanding the lack of Supreme Court case precedent, Professor 
Carlton Larson explained how such a constitutional argument is fraught with 
challenges.  He stated, “The Nobility Clauses rarely appear in academic writ-
ings, and the case law is similarly frugal . . . . [N]o decided case has ever invoked 
them to invalidate federal or state action.”151  In most cases, the clauses have 
been utilized by pro se litigants in asserting vapid claims.152  For example, liti-
gants attempted to assert that driver’s licenses153 and dog licenses154 conferred 
titles of nobility in violation of the Constitution.  The lack of tangible juris-
prudence for those wishing to challenge the matai structure or any similar 
institution requires the unpacking of the history and context that led to the 
adoption of the Nobility Clauses into the Constitution.
When the Constitutional Convention of 1787 convened, the discussion 
of banning titles of nobility was not an unfamiliar subject.  It was considered 
145. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531 n.13 (1980).
146. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532–33 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 535.
149. Id.
150. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531 n.13 (1980).
151. Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the 
Unconstitutionality of legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
1375, 1409–10 (2006).
152. Id.
153. State v. Larson, 419 N.W.2d 897, 898 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1988).
154. City of Bismarck v. Vetter, 417 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1987).
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to be an uncontroversial topic to the Framers because it resonated with 
American sentiments of the time.155  In fact, the Articles of Confederation 
already included such a provision.  In relevant part, it stated that “nor shall 
the United States, in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of 
nobility.”156  Such an aversion to nobility is rooted in the troubled history and 
relationship with the “fundamental[ly] wrong” British monarchy and its insu-
lated aristocracy.157  Indeed, it was this “inherited privilege that the leaders of 
the American Revolution sought to overthrow forever.”158
The Framers’ motivation and the underlying principles behind the 
Nobility Clauses were founded on the notions of equality and the value of 
a meritocracy.  According to Alexander Hamilton, “Nothing need be said to 
illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility.  This may truly 
be denominated the corner stone of republican government; for so long as 
they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will 
be any other than that of the people.”159  James Madison also characterized 
titles of nobility as directly contravening a republican form of government’s 
“complexion.”160  Because of such strong opposition to the social order of a 
monarchy, the Nobility Clauses found their way from the Articles of Con-
federation, to the early state constitutions,161 and then finally into the United 
States Constitution.162
As evidenced by the history and intent behind the Nobility Clauses, there 
may be a legitimate claim against the fa‘a Samoa’s matai structure.  However, 
because the Insular Cases are still good law, courts must employ a different 
framework when Constitutional challenges are brought within the American 
Samoa context as a U.S. territory.  As discussed earlier, as an unincorporated 
territory, Samoa does not enjoy the full application of the Constitution.  As a 
result, as described in the Part below, a court would likely determine that the 
Nobility Clauses are not “fundamental” in American Samoa.
IV. Under the Impractical and Anomalous Framework, the 
Nobility Clauses are not Fundamental
The Downes decision, along with the other Insular Cases, articulated 
the rule that the only constitutional provisions and rights applicable to the 
155. James W. Torke, Nepotism and the Constitution: The Kotch Case—A Specimen in 
Amber, 47 Loy. L. Rev. 561, 615 (2001).
156. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VI, cl. 1.
157. See Brian Mikulak, Classism and Equal opportunity: A Proposal for Affirmative 
Action in Education based on Social Class, 33 How. L.J. 113, 130 (1990).
158. Larson, supra note 151, at 1384.
159. The Federalist no. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
160. The Federalist No. 39, at 236 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
161. An example of a state constitution can be seen with the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights which states, “[N]o title of nobility, or hereditary honours, ought to be granted in 
this State.”  Md. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XL.
162. See larson, supra note 151, at 1383–84; see generally Gordon S. Wood, The 
Radicalism of the American Revolution (1991).
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territories are those so “fundamental in nature” that they are “the basis of 
all free government, which cannot be with impunity transcended.”163  There-
fore, if the Court determines a right or provision to be fundamental under 
the framework of the Insular Cases, then the specific constitutional provision 
would be incorporated into the particular territory.  The process of determin-
ing a fundamental right within a territorial setting is distinct and separate 
from analyzing a fundamental right in the due process context.164  The amor-
phous concept of a fundamental right in the territories “encourage[s] judicial 
legislation and unwarranted judicial activism.  These rights more often than 
not turned out to be the rights of the rich and powerful and were used to 
prevent reform.”165  The lack of a clear articulated rule or meaning has led 
to circuit court splits.166  In one example, the District of Columbia Circuit 
determined that the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial was fun-
damental in 1975, while the Ninth Circuit concluded otherwise in 1984.167
In search for more clarity, some courts developed a workable test to 
determine whether a right is fundamental.  In King v. Morton, for example, 
the D.C. Circuit Court cited Justice John Marshall Harlan’s concurrence in 
Reid v. Covert in determining that a fundamental rights analysis must take 
into consideration “the particular local setting, the practical necessities, and 
the possible alternatives” in order to ascertain whether a right is “impractical 
and anomalous.”168  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Wabol v. Villacrusis utilized 
the same “impractical and anomalous” test because it “sets forth a workable 
standard for finding a delicate balance between local diversity and constitu-
tional command.”169  There, the court found that due to the “vital role native 
ownership of land plays in the preservation of Northern Mariana Islands’ 
(NMI) social and cultural stability,” the restriction on land alienation to 
Indigenous Chamorros and Carolinians was not subject to an Equal Protec-
tion attack.170  According to the Ninth Circuit, applying such a constitutional 
standard would be “impractical and anomalous” to the territory.171  The court 
163. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 291 (1901) (White, J., concurring); Dorr v. United 
States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904).
164. According to Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute, a fundamental 
right is a “group of rights that have been recognized by the Supreme Court as requiring 
a high degree of protection from government encroachment.  These rights are specifically 
identified in the Constitution (especially in the Bill of Rights), or have been found under 
Due Process.”  Fundamental Right, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/fundamental_right.
165. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22, at 372.
166. Clanton, supra note 41, at 150.
167. Id.; see generally N. Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1984); King v. 
Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clanton, supra note 41, at 150–51.
168. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1, 75, 77 (1957) (Harland, J., concurring)).
169. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1462.
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also clarified that “free alienation is impractical in this situation not because 
it would not work, but because it would not work too well.”172
But what does impractical and anomalous mean, and how is it determi-
native when applied to the matai system?  Professor Stanley Laughlin, whose 
work on the Insular Cases was cited by the Ninth Circuit, provides a more 
thorough understanding of this test.  According to Laughlin, the concept of 
impracticality is premised on the notion that applying a certain constitutional 
provision or right would cause “a substantial degree of inconvenience.”173 
Additionally, impracticality requires the territory to be in a unique situa-
tion, meaning that the reasons for not applying a constitutional provision to 
the unincorporated territory cannot be the same reason a state or another 
territory would have.174  For example, “[a] territory could properly argue, as 
American Samoa did in the King case (albeit unsuccessfully), that the Samoan 
culture made it impractical to institute jury trials.”175  Under the anomalous 
test, the question that is asked is whether applying a constitutional provision 
“would damage or destroy the Indigenous culture or some aspect of it.”176
Applying the Nobility Clauses to American Samoa would be imprac-
tical and anomalous, and therefore would not be considered a fundamental 
right under the Insular Cases.  When analyzing the impractical standard, the 
matai system is wholly unique from any other political or leadership structure 
found in a territory or state.  Even attempting to draw similarities between 
the matai system and an American form of government as a way to minimize 
this uniqueness would be incomplete and overly expansive.  Peter Tali Cole-
man, the first governor of Samoan descent in the territory, explained that:
Our American legal system—which also operates in Samoa—is based on 
English jurisprudence as it has evolved over the centuries.  It’s a system of 
conflict resolution which produces clearly identifiable winners and losers.  
Our Samoan culture, on the other hand, is based on thousands of years 
of the evolution of a Polynesian heritage of conflict resolution by consen-
sus building.  Wherever possible, we, as Polynesians, try to avoid conflict.  
When we can’t avoid conflict, we try to resolve it so everyone goes away 
a winner if at all possible.177
Additionally, challengers to the matai system would assert that the ter-
ritorial government is so mirrored after the United States that applying the 
172. Id. at 1462 n.21 (citing Stanley K. Laughlin, The Application of the Constitution in 
United States Territories: American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. Haw. L. Rev. 337, 386 (1980)).
173. See Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22, at 353.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 353–54.  See id. at 353–54 (“The Wabol rule recognized that the U.S. 
Constitution, in the words of my Hawai’i Law Review article paraphrased in the Wabol 
opinion, is not a genocide pact, whether we define genocide as physically destroying a 
people or killing their culture.” (quoting Stanley K. Laughlin, The Application of the 
Constitution in United States Territories: American Samoa, A Case Study, 2 U. Haw. L. Rev. 
337, 386 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
177. Teichert, supra note 12, at 3 (quoting Peter Tali Coleman, Peter Tali Coleman on 
the FbI Report, Samoa News, Aug. 7, 1995, at 10–11).
852020 WHo REAlly IS A NoblE?
Nobility Clauses would be inconsequential.  While it is true that Samoa has 
adopted a western structure of government, such as the bicameral legislative 
branch, it continues to require senators to be registered matai titleholders.178 
Indeed, Samoa’s system has been molded to accommodate and blend with 
Western values and concepts, but the very essence of fa‘a Samoa remains 
central to Samoan law and the Samoan identity.179  Samoan Congressman 
Eni Faleomavaega, in his amici curiae brief for the D.C. Circuit case, Tuaua v. 
United States, explained that the territory “has managed to maintain unique 
cultural practices such as matai titles and community-owned American 
Samoan land; these traditions are unlike anything else in the United States, and 
Congress has made sure to preserve this unique culture for over a century.”180
Stating that the application of the Nobility Clauses would create a 
“substantial degree of inconvenience” would be an understatement.181  The 
matai system and communal land ownership go hand in hand: one cannot 
exist without the other.182  Can the clauses be applied in such a way as to rec-
oncile the matai’s control over the most fundamental social unit in Samoan 
society—the ‘aiga?183  Even assuming that it would be possible to tease apart 
the matai and communal land ownership without any disastrous effects, it 
would nonetheless be substantially inconvenient to force the Samoan people 
to amend their constitution, laws, and everyday cultural practices to accom-
modate the Nobility Clauses.
In the second analysis, the prohibition of nobility titles would detri-
mentally affect land ownership, thereby erasing the very foundation of fa‘a 
Samoa.  Attorney General Sue‘su‘e testified in D.C. District Court that the 
loss of native-owned land “would ultimately destroy [Samoan] society.”184 
Understandably, it is hard to ascertain what hypothetical harms would come 
about if the Nobility Clauses were to be applied to American Samoa.  This 
is especially true when considering that Samoans “have not felt the humili-
ation or sense of defeat that has been described by other communities that 
have experienced colonialism.”185  Despite the lack of comparative harms, the 
framework of the Insular Cases continues to bind the islands to the United 
178. See Am. Samoa Const., art. II, § 3.
179. See Kruse, supra note 13, at 110; Teichert, supra note 12, at 41.
180. Br. for Intervenors or, in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoan 
Government and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 23, Tuaua v. United States, 788 
F.3d 300, 301–02 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5272) (emphasis added).
181. See Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22, at 353.
182.  “Communal ownership of land is a fundamental aspect of American Samoan 
identity because other important parts of Samoan culture, such as the ‘aiga and the matai, 
are intimately and historically predicated upon control of the land.’“ Id. (second emphasis 
added).
183. See Br. of the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defs. at 4–5, Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1143-RJL).
184. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 
637 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 n.2 (D.D.C. 1986).
185. Karen Armstrong, The Weight of Names in American Samoa, 48 Ethnology 53, 
56 (2010).
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States as a possession.  Samoa can and should look to other Indigenous peo-
ples to learn the context and colonial policies that have been detrimental to 
their collective identity and culture.  Indeed, in one observation:
If the fa‘a Samoa disappears, the Samoan values system, sense of respon-
sibility, and social morality would surely disappear with it.  One only need 
observe the heartbreaking social, moral, and economic struggles of the 
Native Americans, native Hawaiians, New Zealand Maoris, and a number 
of other [I]ndigenous groups who have lost their cultural identities, to 
understand the benefit of protecting living cultures.186
Under the “impractical and anomalous” framework, applying the 
sweeping prohibition on nobility titles would have profound and long-last-
ing impacts on culture and identity.  After a careful examination of Samoa’s 
vibrant traditional practices and a contextual inquiry187 into the island’s 
colonial history with the United States, the American courts should con-
clude as the Samoan High Court did, that “[l]and to the American Samoan 
is life itself.”188  Therefore, the Nobility Clauses are not fundamental right in 
American Samoa.
V. The Matai System Meets Constitutional Muster Under 
the Nobility Clauses
Surviving the “impractical and anomalous” test would not foreclose any 
future litigation or federal action.  In fact, as the Court articulated in Downes 
v. bidwell, the United States federal government retains plenary authority 
over the islands by way of the Territorial Clause of the Constitution.189  Addi-
tionally, the Insular Cases to this day have not been overruled and are still 
controlling case law.  As a result, any celebration of surviving application of 
the Nobility Clauses would be short-lived because the United States may 
unilaterally decide through its plenary power to apply the Nobility Clauses 
to Samoa, thus rendering the Insular Cases moot, which leaves open the 
possibility of Samoa becoming fully incorporated and on the path towards 
statehood.190  Therefore, if the Nobility Clauses are imposed on American 
Samoa, the matai system is nonetheless constitutional and should continue 
to be protected.
The underlying principles of the Nobility Clauses are twofold: equality 
and a representative government that is rooted in a meritocracy.  The matai 
system fits both aims.  In addition, any analysis of Samoa must be done con-
textually, paying particular attention to the colonial history of the territory 
186. Teichert, supra note 12, at 42.
187. See generally Sproat, supra note 14 (A Contextual Legal Inquiry or Contextual 
Legal Analysis is an analytical framework that challenges the formalistic approach and 
narrow construction of the law by the judicial system.  It expands realism by centering the 
analysis on those peoples who have been formerly colonized).
188. Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 A.S.R.2d 10, 14 (App. Div. 1980).
189. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 267 (1901).
190. See McBride, supra note 142, at 350.
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and understanding that democracy is not a ‘one size fits all’ regime.  How 
Samoa has effectuated democracy, under the watchful eye of the United 
States, is no less valid than any other country or other Indigenous people’s 
assertion of self-determination.
The matai titleholders adhere to the principle of equality because 
the cultural leaders are chosen through a consensus system of governance. 
Because of this method, every member is given the opportunity to equally 
participate, share concerns, bargain, compromise, and help determine who 
would be the next cultural leader through democratic means.191  Unlike the 
monarchs that the Framers had experience with, the matai are not solely 
based on bloodline.192  In fact, there are nonlineal qualities on which pro-
spective matai are judged, such as oratory skills and knowledge about fa‘a 
Samoa and mythology.193  It was important to the Framers that every individ-
ual was equal before the law and that no person with a title was to be subject 
to immunity because of their position.  In American Samoa, the matai do not 
hold such an untouchable position in society.  In fact, “If the matai acts in a 
way that the ‘aiga feels is unbecoming, or if the matai does not take good care 
of the ‘aiga, the ‘aiga may remove the matai title from the individual and thus 
remove his authority over the family lands.”194
 While the matai system may not comport “with [the] American 
model of representative government,” American Samoa nonetheless employs 
its own valid version of democracy.195  It would be difficult to critique Samoa’s 
form of government when the “idea of secret ballot or voting is totally foreign 
to the Samoan political mind.”196  It is foreseeable that Samoans place little 
weight on voting, when as U.S. nationals they have never had the experience 
of voting in a national election.197
The Nobility Clauses outline prohibitions on two specific actors—
the state and federal governments.  Clause 10 it mandates that “[n]o State 
shall . . . grant a Title of Nobility” and Clause 9 similarly prohibits the grant-
ing of titles “by the United States.”  Based on the principles articulated under 
the Insular Cases, it is clear that an unincorporated territory is not the same 
as a state, which therefore excludes American Samoa from Clause 10’s reach. 
Clause 9 would also be inapposite to the matai system because the United 
States does not grant the Indigenous titles—the ‘aiga do.  Accordingly, “the 
191. See Future Political Status Study Commission, Rep. to Leg. of Am. Samoa, 
11th Leg., 2d Sess., at 50 (1970).
192. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22, at 338.
193. Kruse, supra note 13, at 13–14.
194. Id. at 14.
195. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 22, at 339.
196. McBride, supra note 142, at 349 n.125 (citing E. Hunkin, Some Observations 
on the Matai System’s Leadership Structure in Relation to the Administrative and 
Legislative Processes in American Samoa 1900–1951 8 (Jun. 25, 1973) (unpublished man-
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197. This Comment does not attempt to address the current debate as to whether 
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matai titles are family-based titles and more of a cultural institution than a 
government system of nobility and would most likely fall outside the Nobil-
ity Clause.”198
Additionally, the matai system is actually more of a representative gov-
ernment than the United States’ political structure.  According to a 2013 
statistic, there were 893 matai titles registered with the Office of the Ter-
ritorial Registrar, equaling roughly two percent of the 2012 population of 
55,519.199  This equates to approximately one matai title holder for every 62 
people.200  In comparison, studies anticipate that by 2040, seventy percent of 
the 328 million of Americans will live in the fifteen largest states and be rep-
resented by only seventy senators.201
Finally, it is not the Samoan matai system that offends the Nobility 
Clauses, but actually the Secretary of the Interior, who has unfettered author-
ity over the islands.  This expansive power can be traced to 1951 when the 
governing authority over the islands transferred from the U.S. Navy to the 
Department of Interior through Presidential Executive Order No. 10264.202  As 
such, “the Secretary of the Interior shall take such action as may be necessary 
and appropriate, and in harmony with applicable law, for the administration 
of civil government in American Samoa.”203
Two months after this transfer, the Secretary expanded its authority fur-
ther in two drastic ways.  First, he announced that “[n]o measure affecting the 
powers of the legislature shall become effective without the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior.”204  Second, the Secretary was to approve any laws or 
regulations that would affect the organization or operation of the judiciary.205
The district courts in Hawai‘i and Washington D.C. identified this 
expansive hold that the Interior Secretary has over Samoa.  “Under the pres-
ent system,” the D.C. court determined, “neither the Governor nor the judges 
are truly independent.  The Secretary of the Interior may hire and fire without 
consulting the very people whose daily lives are affected by his decision.”206 
Therefore, as the Hawai‘i court pointed out, such discretionary authority can 
lead “to possible separation of powers problems between the executive and 
judicial branches of government.”207
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In addition, the D.C. court observed that while it may appear that mod-
ern-day limitations are placed on the power of the Secretary of the Interior, 
this has not translated into practice.  For example, the Interior Secretary “per-
mitted”208 the governor to be selected by popular vote, but implicitly asserted 
that in the end the “ultimate supervision”209 rests with the Secretary of the 
Interior.  While popularly electing the governor has a mirage of self-determi-
nation, the operative word is “permitted” which denotes discretion.  In fact, 
the Secretary “retains nearly all legislative, executive and judicial power over 
this territory.  He can appoint and remove officials at will, overturn decisions 
of the Samoan courts, and amend nearly the entire governing system.”210  The 
only limit came in 1983 when Congress removed the Secretary’s ability to 
amend the Samoan Constitution.211  Unlike the Samoan traditional system, 
in which the matai are elected by consensus of the ‘aiga or village, and even 
includes a legal process to remove someone’s title, there is no such process for 
the Secretary of Interior.  The Samoan people are at the will and mercy of the 
Secretary with no effective form of checks and balances, which contravenes 
the very values and intent behind the Nobility Clauses.
Conclusion
The colonial framework that is the Insular Cases has been recently uti-
lized by the Samoan territory as a source of protection for its traditional fa‘a 
Samoa values, and yet this system still leaves the islands under the complete 
discretion of the federal government’s plenary authority.  Fortunately, if the 
United States’ discretion leads to the application of certain constitutional 
provisions such as the Nobility Clauses, the matai system and the commu-
nal lands would pass constitutional muster.  While the Insular Cases may 
have implemented a new colonial regime, they do open the possibility that 
“the United States might dispose of its insular territories.”212  If Samoa has 
been successful thus far in protecting its cultural interests through the Insu-
lar Cases, that same legal imagination could find ways to more permanently 
assert self-determination, if that is the political will of the people.
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